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Wingate: Japanese Salarymen

I. Introduction
Lifelong employment has been an integral aspect to the Japanese lifestyle
since the 1950s. However, due to new attitudes among young Japanese that
emerged post-war, this tradition is gradually changing. More members of the
younger generations are deciding on other career paths that express creativity or
individuality instead of the life of a typical “salaryman” or “office lady.” The
modernization of Japan that occurred during the 1870s has affected post-war
Japan in the late 1980s. After 1955, the younger generations of Japan participated
in what some scholars, such as Kawasaki, call soft individualism (1994, p. 196).
This soft individualism has gradually given way to expressionalism in the 2000s,
resulting in a more materialistic, less group-oriented Japan. In addition, Japanese
women are contributing to the shift from traditional Japanese work practices.
Many women wish to be more independent, and in order to achieve this, they feel
as if they must emulate Western practices or lifestyles, where lifelong
employment is not as common. This paper will exemplify the reasons why
opinions among contemporary Japanese have changed. It will further clarify why
the Japanese culture has turned to consumerism and consequently is beginning to
reject the rigid routine of the salaryman or office lady. To illustrate this social
transformation of Japan, I have surveyed twenty-seven Japanese students that
reside within the vicinity of Tokyo concerning their opinions about lifelong
employment and their own futures. In addition to this, I will explain my own
observances while studying abroad in Japan in 2009. Due to a shift in cultural
values from the 1980s to the present, as well as a series of economic recessions,
the Japanese salaryman, and the tradition of lifelong employment in general, may
be on the road to gradual extinction.
II. Literature Review
Lifelong employment is unusual in most countries, but in Japan, it has
been commonplace and was even expected at firms during the latter half of the
twentieth century. The practice of hiring employees for life became prominent in
Japan during the 1970s after it was established during the 1950s as a negotiation
between workers and their administration (Wolff, 2008, p. 63). Along with
“seniority-based wages and enterprise unions”, the title of salaryman is regarded
“as one of the ‘three sacred treasures’ in Japanese industrial relations” (Wolff,
2008, p. 56). A salaryman, or sarariman, is the term used to refer to white-collar
company employees that earn salaries “based on individual abilities rather than on
seniority” (Robertson, 2005, p. 131). Their unyielding loyalty is a result of the
“three sacred treasures” and consequently, salarymen are known for working long
hours at the office, sometimes up to sixty hours per week (Shibata, 2007, p. 3).
There is not much time for family if one becomes a salaryman. It is thought that
the amount of time spent at the workplace correlates to the perceived efficiency of
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the employee. Many salarymen even work themselves to death, known as karoshi,
or become depressed to the point where they commit suicide. Suicide rates are a
problem among the Japanese because of the amount of stress work induces.
While studying abroad in Japan during spring of 2009, I experienced many
delayed trains due to Japanese salarymen leaping in front of them. Other cases
include death by “subarachnoidal hemorrhage, heart failure, cerebral haemorrhage
or myocardial infarction” (Palumbo, 1994). The life of a salaryman is arduous
and depressing, but they toil on for the benefit of the entire corporation.
Lifelong employment, according to Sullivan, is “the practice whereby
large Japanese firms hire many of their employees directly from high school or
university, employees who are expected to stay with the firm or its subsidiary
companies until at least the time of normal retirement between 55 and 60 years of
age” (1991, p. 79, as cited by Woronoff and Billesbach). Wolff claims that
lifelong employment in Japan is not a law, as it “never forms part of any explicit
contractual promise… [It] is an ‘unwritten… guarantee’, a ‘social norm’, or a
‘moral imperative’” (2008, p. 56). In return for their adamant loyalty, the
company nearly refuses to fire any of its workers unless it is in the “direst set of
circumstances” (Sullivan, 1991, p. 79). Lifelong employment is beneficial to
corporations because it provides dedicated, steady, previously trained and highly
skilled employees (Sullivan, 1991, p. 80).
One of the models used to provide explanation for the Japanese tradition
of lifelong employment is social unity. The Japanese are known for strictly
adhering to their cultural norms of solidarity. Borovoy states that the ideal
Japanese society is one that is “cohesive, protective, and secure, rather than one in
which the individual can freely exercise the right to be different” (2008, p. 552).
Standing out and expressing oneself is looked down upon; loyalty to the larger
group as a whole is paramount in Japanese culture. One should not upset the
balance of relationships if one can help it. These cultural norms perpetuate an
environment conducive to lifelong employment.
Escaping from the strict cultural patterns of Japanese solidarity can be
very difficult. However, a closer examination of Japanese youth during the 1980s
to the 2000s shows that some have broken free from these social expectations.
Many young Japanese are abandoning the cultural traditions of conformity and
cohesion in exchange for a type of individualism or expressionism. As “advanced
mass consumer societies progress”, Kawasaki asserts, “expressionism adopts
more superficial standards” (1994, p. 196). As early as 1955, the younger
generations of Japan began participating in a phenomenon called “soft
individualism” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196). Soft individualism is less connected
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“with the inner or intrinsic self” or with the genuine expression of one’s
personality (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196). Instead, it tends to focus more on
materialism and conforming to the rest of the population. However, in the 1990s
and 2000s, younger generations in Japan have become active participants of
expressionism, which is more concerned with self-actualization. Expressionism is
an “adaptive lifestyle... [where] what one expresses has a significant meaning and
is highly valued” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196). Because of expressionism, Japanese
youths have begun to actively pursue their wants rather than conforming to the
group. In order to exert individuality and independence, they emulate the West
and its consumer cultures. They see the United States as a symbol of
individuality and independence and thus, try to follow its ways. With soft
individualism and expressionism replacing loyalty and conformity, Japanese
lifelong employment has become endangered.
The state of the Japanese economy also plays a role in the drift away from
the Japanese tradition of lifelong employment. Previously, lifelong employment
benefitted the Japanese economy by providing “a stable work force of
experienced employers; loyal cadres due to job security guarantees; and better
trained workers” (Sullivan, 1991, p. 79). However, with “Japan mired in an
economic slump during the 1990s and into the early 2000s, some commentators
were predicting the ‘death’ or deinstitutionalization of lifelong employment”
(Wolff, 2008, p. 54). Normally, Japanese employers would make the choice to
have the firm suffer rather than let employees go. However, when recessions as
difficult as the ones from 1990 to the early 2000s hit, Japanese corporations began
to make different decisions regarding their own labor forces. Parry argues that the
“salaryman’s habitat has deteriorated rapidly since the world financial crisis
began but the change began in the early 1990s when Japan's postwar boom
faltered” (2009, p. 39). Instead of holding onto each employee, companies hire
expendable “dispatch workers” temporarily or part-time, while loyal workers are
laid off (Parry, 2009, p. 39). Due to the series of slumps in the Japanese and
global economy, Japanese salarymen may find themselves out of the office and
onto welfare lines.
Gender issues also factor into the fate of lifelong employment in Japan.
Since the late 1800s, Japanese women have also been affected by the process of
globalization. They began to adapt to the individualistic, consumerist lifestyle of
the West, which ultimately impacts the corporate environment. Hirakawa
maintains that
female critics [who support the ideal lifestyle of Japanese women] often
encourage [them] to defect to the liberated West, criticizing Japanese
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society and the Japanese male as hopelessly mired in tradition (Hirakawa,
2004, p. 424).
Many Japanese women would prefer an American husband over a Japanese one,
believing that if they marry a non-Japanese husband, he will treat her with respect
as an equal. There is a desire to shift from “feudal relations, associated with
obligation and hierarchy, to democratic relations, characterized by choice”
(Tobin, 1994, p. 107). They believe that marrying a Japanese man signifies the
opposite of modernity and independence.
Consequently, many Japanese women attempt to emulate Western
practices or lifestyles in order to exercise more independence. This increased
need for independence and expression of individuality infiltrates attitudes in the
work environment. However, according to Robertson, many Japanese women do
not hold significant or managerial company positions (2004, p. 132). By
ultimately segregating women and not allowing them to enjoy the benefits of
lifelong employment, the percentage of businesspeople hired for life at Japanese
corporations is inevitably going to decrease from now on.
Because of the emergence of a consumer culture, a shift away from
Confucian values, a weakened economy, and gender issues, this paper will
explain the decline of lifelong employment in Japan since the 1980s.
III. Methodological Approach
The method I chose to analyze the changes that are occurring in
contemporary Japanese society is a combination of reviewing existing literature,
empirical analysis, and personal observation. In order to conduct empirical
research, I constructed a survey that asked a number of open-ended questions. I
surveyed twenty-seven Japanese contemporaries, ages ranging from eighteen to
twenty-four.1 The questions asked pertained to the opinions of the participant
concerning lifelong employment in Japan and his or her future plans after
graduating from a university. I also inquired whether or not he or she believed
that the practice of lifelong employment has helped or hurt the economy of Japan
and if he or she wishes to work for a company in the future that exercises this
tradition. In addition, the participant was asked to list the occupations of their
1

I sought originally at least fifty respondents. The method of distribution I used was to ask ten
friends currently residing in Japan and have them ask five Japanese college-age friends to
complete and return my survey to me via e-mail. I received twenty-seven completed surveys and
because it was not the volume I anticipated, my results may be skewed or ambiguous. In no way
do my surveys represent all of Japan’s population; it is merely a sample size of a bigger picture.
Surveying college age or entry-level Japanese serves as an indicator for their future career choices
and opinions on lifelong employment.
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mothers and fathers. I will compare and contrast data collected from other
scholars from the 1990s to the information that I have gathered in 2009. Some of
the issues I will consider are the tendency of Japanese contemporaries to choose
an occupation similar to that of a parent, if the participant thinks that lifelong
employment is viable for the economy of Japan, and the reasons to why or why
not he or she hopes for lifelong employment in the same profession.
The third method that I have utilized to examine the change in attitudes of
contemporary Japanese students is observational primary research. By simply
noticing certain happenings or the habits of Japanese people that fell into the
college student age or entry-level age, I could gather some information about their
behaviors. Passive observance allows the spectator a small glimpse into a part of
their daily lives, whether it be on the trains, out on the street, at school, and so
on.2
To supplement my observational primary research, I will also refer to a
number of personal dialogues with Japanese friends or acquaintances during my
semester in Japan. These conversations have given me insight into how collegeage Japanese students feel about their future and employment post-graduation.
IV. Why Has Lifelong Employment Been Prominent in Japan until the
1980s?
The following models are possible explanations for why lifelong
employment exists in Japan. Some scholars attribute it to the distinct culture of
Japan, while others believe it emerged due to organizations wishing to exert more
control over their employees. Another opinion for the existence of lifelong
employment is based on economics.
Collectivist Culture
The fierce loyalty that Japanese businessmen exert is often explained via
Japan’s unique culture. Japanese society is noted for its solidarity and sense of
social responsibility, which most likely stems from a relatively homogenous
population. The CIA World Factbook reports that with a population of
127,078,679 as of July 2009, ninety-eight and a half percent are Japanese, while
the other one and a half percent is comprised of Koreans, Chinese, and other
ethnicities (CIA – The World Factbook – Japan, 2009). Japanese culture expects
its members to be obedient, disciplined, self-inhibited, and harmonious towards
2

Obviously, there are limitations to observational primary research. I did not talk to the people
that I observed while I was in Japan, and while the behavior of one or a few particular Japanese
people does not represent the entire population of Japan, I may be able to come to some
conclusions based on a few case studies or small details that I picked up between these encounters.
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the group (Borovoy, 2008, p. 553). In Japan, people are concerned more for the
community as a whole than themselves as individuals. The lower class has a
desire to work with others, while the upper class has obligations to help those
subordinate to them. There is a certain harmony, peace, and balance between
people. These characteristics of Japanese culture facilitate the nature of the
corporate environment. Japanese businesspeople devote a large portion of their
lives to their respective firms because they are doing so for the benefit of the
company as a whole. They put their health, their families, and their personal time
aside in order to devote themselves entirely to a larger group. Although Japanese
culture places a great emphasis on family, it seems as if some salarymen replace
their families with their corporations. Businesspeople “see the firm as a substitute
family which, in turn, fosters cooperative, collegiate relationships” (Wolff, 2008,
p. 62). Japanese salarymen often neglect their families in order to put in longer
hours at the corporation.
Obligations or duties are another important aspect of Japanese political
culture. Japanese salarymen carry out their corporate duties on a daily basis; the
obligations that exist between social classes are comparable to the ones that are
apparent in the firm. Japanese culture is considered to be collectivist on a vertical
scale, meaning that it is an authority-ranking culture where there are profound
psychological relationships between leaders and followers. For example, instead
of a handshake, which is an indicator of equality, the Japanese greet each other
with a bow. The lower one bows, the more respect he or she is showing. In most
Japanese firms, there is no room for promotions or horizontal mobility. The
majority of Japanese corporations are vertically integrated; this organizational
pattern “guarantees diligence by employees and the paternal benevolence of
employers… The preference for harmony over conflict ensures industrial peace
and the humanistic practices of personnel managers” (Wolff, 2008, p. 62).
The emphasis on education also influences culture, which, in turn, shapes
the Japanese corporate environment. Post-war Japan became a “diploma society”,
which entails that “over the course of several decades, educational careers became
linked with the lifetime employment system and effectively became a stamp on
individuals that is treated as an ascribed status” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 195). This
facilitates the collectivism that emerges in the workplace. Individualism and
voluntarism are suppressed, and consequently, relations among the group are in
more or less in agreement (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 195). There is a certain order in
Japanese society that infiltrates every aspect of life. Lifelong employment is an
integral part to the Japanese industrial lifestyle. It enhances its cohesiveness, its
offers its members protection, and it is secure (Borovoy, 2008, p. 552).
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Political or Control Model
The political or control model states that lifelong employment was first
implemented so managers could regulate their companies more easily. This
model holds that “social relations and strategic political choices govern the design
of the economy” (Wolff, 2008, p. 65). Employment for life was established in
order to keep peace within the business environment. By limiting their
employees’ choices, corporations had much more control over the workforce in
terms of pay or switching them to different offices while taking away the option
of leaving altogether. Wolff cites Wilthagen and Tros, arguing that with this,
companies gained a sense of flexicurity, which is a “balance between security of
tenure and flexibility of working conditions” (Wolff, 2008, p. 65).
Economic or Market Model
Another lesser used explanation for the practice of lifelong employment in
Japan is the market model. It assumes that workers are self-regarding, rational
beings and that the Japanese market demonstrates neo-classical growth theory
(Wolff, 2008, p. 61). According to Sullivan, under the economic model, Japanese
employees will try to find security in the form of lifelong employment (1991, p.
84). In order to entice skilled workers to join their corporations, managers offered
them the guarantee of employment for life.
Japanese Student Surveys
In order to understand how Japanese youth of the 2000s feel about lifelong
employment, I constructed and distributed a survey during autumn 2009 to my
college age Japanese students. Included in the survey were questions that asked
the participant’s age, gender, occupations of mother and father; the participant’s
plans after graduating from college; his or her opinion on lifelong employment;
whether or not he or she believed lifelong employment helped the economy of
Japan; if he or she wished to work for a company that guaranteed lifelong
employment; and the reasons why or why not.
Out of the twenty-six students surveyed, ages ranging from eighteen to
twenty-four, fifteen, more than half, had fathers that were salarymen or office
workers. Three had fathers that were doctors, and the remaining eight had fathers
that were self-employed or owned his own business, were pharmacists, or
accountants.

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2011

7

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2

Out of the same group, ten had mothers that were housewives. Four others had
mothers that worked part-time jobs in addition to housekeeping. Two had
mothers that were secretaries or office ladies. The remaining ten had mothers that
had specific occupations, such as owners of insurance companies, pharmacists, or
accountants.

To compare whether or not the younger generations of Japanese were following in
the footsteps of their parents, participants were asked their plans post-graduation.
Three out of twenty-seven students were unsure, while four planned to continue
their education. Four knew that they just wanted to enter the workforce, and
eleven had specific jobs or fields in mind. Only four out of the twenty-seven
surveyed students, fifteen percent, thought they would become a salaryman or an
office lady.
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These survey results illustrate the change in views between generations. Twentytwo out of twenty-seven students, or eighty-one percent, have post-graduate plans
other than becoming salarymen or office ladies. While the majority of mothers
were housewives, none of the twenty-two females surveyed planned on becoming
housekeepers after graduating from college. Forty-four percent of surveyed
students had specific occupations in mind, such as working for a publisher,
owning their own company, becoming a banker, or English teacher.
College-age and entry-level Japanese of 2009 have different mindsets
regarding careers from their parents and the previous generation. Even during the
1990s, according to Herbig, Japanese college-age students were selecting
occupations that “call for some creativity and a degree of independence”,
illustrating “the desire for more freedom of expression” (1995, p. 51). This trend
is continuing during the 2000s, and will probably escalate as even more time goes
on, thus threatening the custom of lifelong employment in Japan. The choices of
their parents are affecting the decisions of younger generations less and less. No
longer do they routinely follow in the footsteps of tradition; instead, contemporary
Japanese youth are making choices for themselves, expressing their own wants,
and exploring their individuality and independence.
Although ten out of twenty-six surveyed students saw the tradition of
lifelong employment in Japan as a beneficial system, three students saw it as a
drawback, and the remaining thirteen students either believed it was neither good
nor bad or saw both the benefits and disadvantages of lifelong employment.
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Survey participants believed the lifelong employment system is beneficial
because it offers employees security, gives them motivation to work diligently,
fosters a sense of unity, and health insurance and bonus systems are based on it.
Negative aspects of lifelong employment, according to the students, included the
lack of motivation it generates because employees get paid regardless of
performance, its dullness or monotony, and its inflexibility when considering the
mobility of people or job-switching. At least seven students alluded to changing
values, individuality, or changing career paths and stated that employees should
not be pressured into staying with one company for their entire lives.
Sixteen out of twenty-six students believed that the tradition of lifelong
employment has helped the economy of Japan, and seventeen out of twenty-five
participants answered yes when asked if they wanted to work for a company that
offers lifelong employment. Most of their reasons included that in the poor state
of the economy of 2009, job security is important, if they have a stable career,
they can concentrate more on their work, and it will motivate them if they stay
with one company for a long period of time. Furthermore, four out of twentyseven students wanted to work for a company that guaranteed lifelong
employment for reasons related to gender issues.
Some participants
acknowledged that it is difficult for women to find jobs in Japan. In addition,
some students believed that lifelong employment would help women who leave
work to get married or have children, or would be beneficial for working mothers
in general.
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However, nine out of twenty-seven students had reasons why they would not want
to work at the same organization for the rest of their lives.
Although my survey results are mixed, suggesting some ambivalence,
there are also reasons that uphold my hypothesis that the values and attitudes of
Japanese youth culture are changing and are leaning farther away from the
occupations of salarymen, office ladies, and lifelong employment. Some of the
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reasons for not wanting lifelong employment included wanting to try many
different companies. Some students know that they will not work for one
organization for the rest of their lives, others wished to be evaluated not by their
loyalty but by their actual work, some students are still searching for what they
are truly called to do. With more viewpoints such as these emerging in Japan, it
signifies the change in the quality of life, thus making the tradition of lifelong
employment less desirable to Japanese youth. Many college-age and entry-level
Japanese are searching for a career that will suit them, not simply taking a
position and working for life for one particular company.
Comparisons Between 1990s and 2000s Japanese Youth
In comparison with the results Lee-Cunin found, Japanese youth of 2009
and of the 1990s have very similar mindsets. Lee-Cunin asked Japanese students
their ideal job and the job that they would probably obtain. The most prominent
ideal job was civil servant, the second was accountant, and the third ideal job was
unknown. Realistically, most students did not know their future occupation.

“Many reflected their awareness of graduate unemployment” due to the recession
during the 1990s (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 124). Similarly, many students that
participated in the 2009 survey expressed concern about finding employment in
the midst of economic downturn. Stability and security were important to both
groups of students. However, employment for life may not be an option with a
poor economy; companies might not even hire students right after they complete
their college education.
In regards to following the traditions of the older generations, some
Japanese students from over a decade ago wanted similar occupations to those of
their parents. Lee-Cunin asserted that the
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parental employment status of some of the students could... be an
influential factor in these results... Students would be more aware of the
advantages or disadvantages of occupations that their parents had” (2004,
p. 125).
Compared to the results of the 2009 survey, more and more Japanese students are
opting for occupations that are different from their predecessors.
One survey group from the 1990s reflected a level of individuality
comparable to that of the 2009 students.

This group of Japanese students expressed “an individual flair regarding their
ideal job” (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 125). Similarly, participants from the 2009
survey group expressed individualism not only by aspiring for specific jobs such
as working for a publisher, English teacher, or a career using French language
skills, but also by stating that they are going to search for an occupation that suits
them or that they plan on experiencing multiple jobs throughout their lifetime.
Both survey groups also exemplified gender issues. Some participants in
the 1990s group knew they faced gender discrimination and thus expressed
concern about obtaining a job as a female. Some female students believed that
they ultimately might end up as office ladies, “the gender-specific low status
position with few chances of promotion” (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 126). Four out of
twenty-seven participants in the 2009 group also expressed concern over
discrimination in the workplace. However, the difference between the two groups
is that the students surveyed in 2009 did not have an overwhelming majority
planning to become office ladies post-graduation, whereas the 1990s group did.
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The two survey groups illustrate the increasing trend of individuality and
expressionism among the Japanese youth. “15.4 per cent” of the 1990s group
believed that, realistically, they would become salarymen, the second prominent
reality occupation (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 126).3 Meanwhile the 2009 group gave
reasons why they would probably not work for only one company for life. The
2009 group showed an increase in not choosing an occupation based on those of
their parents. However, both groups exemplified the gender issues still facing
women in the work environment and the concern of finding a job in an
unfavorable economy.
V. Why the Change?
The Decline of Lifelong Employment and Endangered Salarymen
Lifelong employment was able to thrive up until the 1980s because
traditional Confucian values were upheld extensively in Japanese society, namely
“loyalty, discipline, and sincerity” (Robertson, 2005, p. 382). One was perceived
to possess strength if he or she was able to put others before his or herself. Prior
to urbanization in the 1950s, rural values promoted social obligation and
harmony, which facilitated lifelong employment in the work environment. As
urbanization occurred, however, there was a loss of Confucian values, which were
replaced by new ones such as individualism and expressionism in a consumer
culture.
About Modern Japan – The Process of Industrialization
Modernization officially began for Japan when United States Commodore
Matthew C. Perry and his fleet of black ships opened up the country from a long
period of isolation in 1853 (Adams, 2009, p. 37). Since this occurrence, the
Japanese have wanted to emulate the ways of the West. “As early as 1858... the
only way for Japan to cope with the West was to ‘imitate [the] good things which
the enemy has’” (Adams, 2009, p. 37). The leaders during the Meiji period
already knew that they really had no choice but to imitate Euro-American
countries (Robertson, 2005, p. 40). Despite the contempt that the Japanese had
for the United States and Europe, they wanted to acquire the technological skills
of the West while still retaining their Japaneseness. They may not have liked
Westerners, but they, too, wished to benefit from certain aspects of Western
culture. Thus, the Meiji Restoration, which took place from 1868 to 1912,
“transformed feudal Japan into a nation state” (Adams, 2009, p. 37).
3

Although both Lee-Cunin and I found about fifteen per cent of surveyed students in the 1990s
and 2009 groups, respectively, that planned or saw themselves as salarymen or office ladies in the
future, my data may be skewed due to less participants (2004, p. 126). However, despite my
limitations, the data collected from the 2009 group offers a sampling of a larger population of
Japanese youth culture.
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The Japanese perceived Western ideals, science, and technology,
essentially, industrialization, as a symbol of worldly status. The Japanese felt the
need to compete with the United States on a technological level almost instantly.
They embraced modernization but did so in a way that combined their distinctive
culture with the advances that other countries had made during the time period
they spent isolated under the Tokugawa. This is how Japan was able to
successfully industrialize.
The modernization that occurred in Japan during the late 1800s continued
throughout the 1900s. With this, a “global culture of consumption… patterned on
American developments” emerged during the early 1900s (Gordon, 1993, p. 242).
The time period between World War I and World War II, also known as the
interwar period, was integral to Japanese modernization (Harootunian, 2001, p.
xi). Accelerated changes occurred especially in 1955 and after; this was when the
mass culture of Japan came into being (Gordon, 1993, p. 242). As Japan became
more urbanized, cities quickly grew, becoming centers of “machines, speed, and
capitalist production and consumption” (Adams, 2004, p. 71).
It was this very era of capitalism that bred the concept of white-collar
workers known as salarymen. After Japan underwent industrialization, Japanese
companies gave up on intimate, personal ties.
“[Intermediating], direct
interpersonal relationships” were weakened, thus leading to the competitive
nature of the workplace (Shibata, 2007, p. 309). The salaryman’s allegiance to
the firm
has little to do with concrete relationships with co-workers, and the target
of their 'loyalty' (i.e., the 'corporation') is a discursively constructed and
aestheticized object that they imagine to directly belong to without any
mediating social relationship (Shibata, 2007, p. 309).
New Values
There were two occurrences that led to a change in values among young
Japanese people that has led to a decline in the appeal of lifelong employment and
the salaryman career track. The first was the process of urbanization. Once
standards of living changed for youth culture in Japan, “it was necessary for urban
Japanese to deny rural values”, for example, social collectivism, and instead
“create new urban values” such as “a new configuration of group consciousness
and individualism” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 189, 188). There was “an inconsistency
[that] existed between the students’ goals and the necessities of an urban lifestyle”
that led to the change in what was important to them (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 189).
Urbanization bred the consumer culture that welcomed the youth of Japan into the
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world, which has caused the youths of Japan to assess value differently and
facilitated the need to express themselves.
The second instance that led to the value shift among Japanese youth
culture was the generation gap that was created between the young and the old
due to industrialization. According to Kawasaki, there are four waves of Japanese
youth culture based on chronology and the urbanization process of Japan. The
first group existed before the 1870s prior to industrialization occurring; the
second group was the actual urban youth culture that transpired and peaked during
the interwar period of 1880 to 1950; the third group of Japanese youth
experienced rapid economic growth from 1950 to the 1970s; and the fourth is
what Kawasaki refers to as the partakers in an “advanced consumption culture”
living in Japan during the latter 1970s and beyond (1994, p. 186-189). These four
waves of youth culture had mindsets that differed from their predecessors. Older
conservatives saw the process of modernization “frightening” and “could not cope
with the freedom and autonomy of the new urban ways” (Adams, 2009, p. 42).
They felt that the “new consumerism, self-gratification, and open sexuality were
too threatening” (Adams, 2009, p. 42). The combination of urbanization and the
generation gap lead to a change in youth values that Japan had never seen before.
“Unlike their parents, such individuals find identity not through participation in a
pattern of reciprocal obligation, but through the goods they purchase” (Tobin,
1994, p. 108). The older generation, affected by World War II, learned how to
save and conserve material goods also how to put others first. In contrast, the
younger generations of Japan were not affected by the war directly and feel less
compelled to save money or food (Herbig, 1995, p. 54). Brought up in an age of
consumerism and capitalism, they take a more self-centered approach to life.
As products of modernization, Japanese youth have forgotten about
Confucian values that allow lifelong employment to thrive. Some of the
participants of the 2009 survey have exemplified new values of individuality
instead of solidarity through their future career choices and reasons for shunning
lifelong employment.
To some Japanese youth, modernization signifies
individualization; self-sacrifice no longer has significance (Robertson, 2005, p.
382). Instead, Japanese youth feel a sense of entitlement without a sense of
obligation. Because they were born in the midst of post-war consumer society,
they experienced affluence instantly.
Being lazy, having fun and enjoying life are good things; to sweat and
work are not trendy. Shinjinrui tend to be practical, easy-going and
disturbingly money-minded. They are inclined to work to live than live to
work and are much less ready to submerge their personal ambitions and
private lives to the success of the company... Japan's youth often wish to
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wrap the minimum amount of work around their play (Herbig, 1995, p.
51).
Due to the effects of globalization, jobs have become more flexible, thus Japanese
youth feel that they do not need to work as much or as diligently. With the
internet, the culture of the workplace has changed, even going as far as to bring
work to people’s homes. Being raised in an affluent post-war society constantly
being shaped by globalization, young Japanese have grown up with a new sense
of values from those of the previous generations.
Consumer Culture That Emerged
As mentioned previously, there were four waves of Japanese youth culture
that emerged prior to industrialization, during the interwar period, post-war, and
post-economic crisis. It was the modernization that took place during the 1800s
and the 1900s that laid the groundwork for capitalistic expansion and gave birth to
a consumer culture in Japan. During the late 1800s, Japan became more
urbanized by establishing a system of currency, by practicing capitalism, and by
introducing consumer goods into society (Adams, 2009, p. 37-38). Although the
Japanese adapted Western ways of modernization to suit their own culture, they
still admired the United States. Later in the 1920s, “traditional ways were being
overwhelmed by Americanization, so much that [there was] a ‘spread of mass
culture and consumption…’ (Adams, 2004, p.71). Part of the reason why Japan
embraced consumerism is because it represented American ways. For example,
Ginza, one of the most popular shopping districts in Tokyo, was known as
the cosmopolitan heart of Tokyo, Ginza has been the quintessential
symbol of America since the 1920s and many Japanese cities sought to
imitate what in fact was an elite consumer culture. If anything, this
consumerist culture was more powerful than the sighting of American
warships in the fateful year of 1853 (Delanty, 2003, p. 116).
As the population of Japan migrated from the rural areas to cities during
the early 1900s, they were targeted as consumers, most notably Japanese women
(Adams, 2004, p. 71). Because Japan industrialized and adopted a consumer
culture, there has been a shift in Japanese attitudes. By placing more emphasis on
consumer goods, the Japanese were making decisions for themselves based on
wants and beginning to express individualism. The Japanese saw consumption as
a symbol of status.
For many years, Western-style has been associated not only with status
and individuality but also with goritekisa, rationality and functionality. In
the postwar period, the emphasis was on improving life by supplying each
home with ‘necessary goods – a small refrigerator, a vacuum cleaner, a
water heater, a small black-and-white television set. Although efficiency
and rationality are still highly valued in contemporary Japan, ‘style’ and
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fulfillment’ are increasingly the focus of consumer desire (Tobin, 1992, p.
115).
Products fashioned like their American counterparts or goods imported from the
West gave the Japanese a sense of individuality. After World War II, especially,
the Japanese wanted to obtain the feelings of independence that emanated from
American culture. As a result, they participated in this modern life of “mass
consumption of commodity culture” (Harootunian, 2001, xx). With such
emphasis on independence and material wants, especially during the 1980s, there
emerged “a new, feeling-based individual sensibility” (Gordon, 1993, p. 253).
From my observations while in Japan, I saw that much of this is still the
same. Japan is still a country largely based on consumerism and material goods.
Many of the stores in Japan are for convenience, but the majority of them are for
shopping. Many members of the younger generations of Japan are highly
materialistic, following fashion trends and shopping often for leisure. I saw this
in both males and females from the teenage to college age group, although
probably more so in females. There is little distinction between needs and wants;
Japan, with its consumer culture, has changed its people into believing that what
they want is really what they require.
Shinjinrui
Perhaps the most significant reason why attitudes towards lifelong
employment in Japan have changed is due to what some scholars refer to as
shinjinnrui. Shinjinrui represents a new youth culture in Japan that emerged
during the 1980s, literally “a new human species” or “new breed” in comparison
to older, existing traditions (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 191; Robertson, 2005, p. 141).
The goal of the shinjinrui is to “be different from everyone else, to do what you
want” (Herbig, 1995, p. 53-54). Its members were born into an “affluent,
wealthy, powerful, influential, arrogant Japan” after the growth in the post-war
economy (Herbig, 1995, p. 49). Many older generations perceive this new youth
culture in a negative light, saying that they have “become removed from
traditional Japanese values” (Robertson, 2005, p. 160). Shinjinrui are remarkable
due to three characteristics. The first is strong adherence to individualism and
“selfish behavior patterns, in which youth tend to place highest priority on
individual benefit or values”, the second is partaking in a consumer culture, and
the third is expressionism, or “the tendency to insist on presenting oneself and the
individual's attachment to such presentations” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 191).
The Japanese youth culture of the 1980s was different from previous
generations of Japanese people because they had begun to experiment with
individualism, but it was not a complete change. Although it was during this time
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that differences in attitudes developed a rift between the older and younger
generations, Japanese youth culture only practiced what Kawasaki calls “soft
individualism” during the 1980s, meaning that most of their decisions still tended
to be conformist in nature (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196). It was difficult to break out
of the “longstanding traditional culture” or “highly patterned culture” of harmony
and amenable relationships (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196).
The next generation of Japanese youth culture, the shinjinrui of the 1990s,
was similarly brought up in environments that facilitated “group mentality”; for
example, home and school (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 197). However, during this
decade,
group consciousness began to change... [it became] narrower in scope... At
the same time, their consumer life and lifestyle reflect an individualistic
side... Their behavioral patterns and thoughts weaken their uniformity and
orient them in multidimensional directions (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 197).
Shinjinrui of the 1990s were further along in the practice of true
individualism; instead of following the group, members of the younger Japanese
generation were making decisions for themselves and expressing their individual
personalities. They were able to exceed and go beyond the traditional patterns of
Japanese culture of “conflict avoidance” and “peer conformism”, resulting in
“preferences representing a shift from the formalized and large scale to the more
individual and small scale” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 196). Because of the distinct
characteristics shinjinrui of the 1990s exerted – individualism, consumerism, and
expressionism – they have paved the way for a change in perception of the
Japanese tradition of employment for life. The adaptability of expressionism has
given more flexibility to the youth of Japan. The emphasis placed on
individualism and expressionism induces less concern for something larger, such
as a corporation. With a generation that has begun to focus largely on his or
herself rather than the benefit of a bigger group, the age of the salaryman and
office lady have begun to decline. Once seen as a hard-working, devoted
businessman, salarymen are perceived are now seen as “nothing more than latterday kamikaze pilots in business suits” (Robertson, 2005, p. 141). More and more
young Japanese have begun to “reject the constraints of being a sarariman in a
corporate society” (Robertson, 2005, p. 136). The students that participated in
my surveys exerted some of these characteristics through their reasons why they
did not prefer lifelong employment at one company.
In addition, many shinjinrui live in the moment and think only of shortterm problems rather than think of what is best for their futures. They possess
“narrow and short-sighted perspectives” (Herbig, 1995, p. 52). This change in
mindset and values is reflected in the following statistics:
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The percentage deriving pleasure from work dropped from 29 per cent in
1970 to less than 20 per cent in 1980 for those aged 20 to 25. Among
those under 20, only 25 per cent claim to be prepared to sacrifice their
lives to a company, compared with 45 per cent of 50 year olds. In 1940,
20 year olds wanted above all to 'lead a temperate and honest life to work
for the good of society'; in the 1980s onwards, young peopel believe that
the main aim in life is personal pleasure (Herbig, 1995, p. 51).
The 1980s marks a period in time when attitudes among the Japanese youth began
to shift. Ever since then, young Japanese people are becoming more and more
individualistic. Rather than work themselves to death, Japanese youth from the
1980s and after are thinking about how to enjoy themselves. There is an evident
disparity between the attitudes of salarymen and that of the shinjinrui. The object
of import has changed from the firm to the individual. The culture of Japan is
transitioning from one that was “anchored in fixed [Confucian] values” to one of
“fantasy and desire” (Harootunian, 2001, xix).
With a change in values, attitudes of Japanese students concerning
education have also changed. The shinjinrui generally do not place as much
emphasis on achievements or accomplishments. Although shinjinrui are mostly
“wealthy and well-educated university students”, not all of them “have high
educational attainment or a strong success orientation” (Robertson, 2005, p. 160,
Kawasaki, 1994, p. 191). In fact, when prompted to list things that brought them
anxiety, most Japanese students said, “education, educators, school, university,
other students, home, parents and personal problems” (Herbig, 1995, p. 52).
Furthermore, Kawasaki analyzes that for Japanese youth culture, “university is
like an amusement park” (1994, p. 193).
To this, I can personally attest. While attending Sophia University, a
private, prestigious school located in Tokyo, I took classes that were mixed with
exchange students and Japanese students. On several occasions, I would look
around the classroom and see that some of the Japanese students were blatantly
sleeping in class.
Without education being stressed as much as before among the youth of
Japan, the aforementioned diploma society that the country once had is now
weakened. Shinjinrui do not take school as seriously; they are not concerned with
obtaining an established career path, and thus they are “ill-equipped for the
stresses of corporate life in an economic superpower and yearning for escape”
(Herbig, 1995, p. 50). This is not to say that all working people of the shinjinrui
generation are lazy; they work just enough but never more than they should.
They are “increasingly reluctant to go beyond the call of duty and turn a good-
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enough performance into a superb one”, states Herbig, describing them as the
“goldfish generation” for the reason that they “have to be hand-fed everything”
(1995, p. 50). All of this then forces change upon the corporate environment and
the system of permanent employment.
Lifelong employment has become threatened with modernization
ultimately leading up to the birth of this new type of Japanese youth and its new
set of values. The “doctrine of self-sacrifice” has been defied by the shinjinrui
that do take positions in corporations since the 1980s (Robertson, 2005, p. 141).
Working shinjinrui have no qualms about changing their occupations multiple
times throughout their lives or altering management operations. The quality of
life in Japan has changed from wanting to work hard for one company to devoting
more time for oneself. How can lifelong employment possibly survive if the
unwavering loyalty and diligence that the Japanese once displayed towards one
company is vanishing?
Growing Individuality
Due to modernization, the advent of shinjinrui, and changing values, the
Japanese youth have been exerting more individuality. Soft individualism during
the 1950s gave way to expressionism during the latter years of the twentieth
century. Instead of suppressing their differences, young Japanese have begun to
pursue their own wants, caring more for their own happiness or attaining selfactualization. During the 1990s, kojinshugi, meaning individualism, was “a word
heard more and more, and almost always in reference to young people” (Herbig,
1995, p. 51). One study showed that Japanese students placed great value on
“individual pursuits – such as exercising, pursuing personal hobbies or being with
friends” (Herbig, 1995, p. 51).
Similar to the emergence of shinjinrui, a phenomenon known as freeters
developed in the 1980s. A freeter is one that holds a series of part-time jobs,
never obtaining a genuine career, and is more concerned with hobbies or
independence (Robertson, 2005, p. 136).4 Related to freeters are NEETs, which is
an acronym that stands for “No Education, Employment, or Training” (Robertson,
2005, p. 136). Members of this Japanese youth culture refuse to work at all. In
2003, there were at least 400,000 NEETs that fell between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-four; this figure is five times the amount from 1997 (Robertson, 2005, p.
136). This symbolizes how the attitudes of Japanese youth culture are quickly
changing. Just from the 1980s to the 1990s, and then another comparison of the
late 1990s to the 2000s shows that young Japanese people are caring less about
4

The term freeter is the result of combining “free” and “Arbeiter”. The Japanese use the term
“arubaito” for work. It is a loan word from German.
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working hard and more about their own freedom. Contemporary Japanese youth
feel less shame if they do not secure stable employment. They are more
concerned about their own happiness and comfort.
Japanese society overall puts significant pressure on the youth, especially
with entrance exams, parents, and gender dichotomies (Kelly, 1993, p. 530).
Perhaps Japanese high school and college students want to get away from societal
pressures such as these. Such pressures lead to emotional distress, which can
influence how Japanese students function at school, in public, and ultimately, in
the workplace. Borovoy emphasizes hikikomori, which translates to “withdrawn”
and refers to those that cut themselves off from society (2008, p. 552). In a
culture that “has historically prioritized inclusion and mainstreaming as key
elements of democracy, over the expression of individual rights”, hikikomori
“would, in a freer society, be designing computer games, handcrafting furniture or
launching small software startups” (Borovoy, 2008, p. 553). Such activities
require ingenuity and freedom of expression. What provides an escape for this
young generation of Japanese is partaking in activities that bring them happiness
instead of doing what others want them to do. However, the anxiety from social
pressures leads many hikikomori to refuse school attendance as well as later
“failing to find a compelling job” after completing college (Borovoy, 2008, p.
554). The poor work ethic exemplified by these disturbed youths has contributed
to the decline of the salaryman. With less Japanese students working diligently in
school, there are less that go on to work for companies for the rest of their lives
until retirement.
The need to express oneself has influenced other Japanese that do choose
to obtain a career path. More and more Japanese are choosing specialized
occupations that “call for some creativity and a degree of independence” (Herbig,
1995, p. 51). There is a possibility that the Japanese youth culture is exerting
more individuality because they gain no fulfillment following in the footsteps of
their parents, particularly concerning occupation. They have noticed that they are
only making decisions because their parents did it or they are carrying on a
tradition blindly. It has become simply a custom to fall into the occupation of a
salaryman or an office lady, and young Japanese people do not know why they do
it. It is only done out of habit, and now they are breaking out of it.
Japanese entry-level students also feel that they have more choices
regarding career paths, which leads them to explore their own creativity and
exercise their individuality in college and also after graduation.
The student attitude towards graduate school and employment reflected
their awareness of the realities of life outside of university; with a
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significant number of them stating that they did not know what they would
do after graduating” (Lee-Cunin, 2004, p. 138).
One particular Japanese college student I know replied that she did not know what
to do when I inquired about post-graduate plans. She had studied abroad in the
United States. Globalization, plus new attitudes and values among her peers and
having many more career choices, probably affected her answer. “Japanese
international youth have become a new privileged group. Together, these trends
have begun to break the uniformity that formerly characterized Japanese youth
culture” (Kawasaki, 1994, p. 199).
Even Japanese that have secured employment for life wish to exert more
individuality and creativity. Recruit Research Corporation conducted a survey
that came to the conclusion that “more than half of salaried Japanese workers say
they would switch jobs or start their own business if a favorable opportunity
arose” (Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11). Some salarymen feel “imprisoned by the concept
of ‘masculinity’”; they wish to leave the workforce to pursue personal interests
instead (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 247). The ability to switch occupations and
the feeling of wanting to do so among the working class has increased in Japan
since the 1990s, and will probably continue to increase as time goes on. The
Japanese have begun to worry less about losing face when they leave a company
to find a new job. Globalization has also had an effect on some Japanese
salarymen, especially those that have attended schools in other countries, showing
them that workers in other nations do not always stay loyal to one company
(Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11).
Due to urbanization in the mid-1900s, the perception of the salaryman has
become tarnished. The rigid life of a salaryman, full of sacrifice as he neglects
his family by working to death, no longer appeals to the Japanese youth of the
2000s as they aspire to achieve personal goals that reflect feelings of growing
expressionism. Consequently, the tradition of lifelong employment in Japan has
been on the decline since the 1980s and will continue even past the 2000s.
VI. Economic Downturn
There seems to be much worry among Japanese college students stemming
from the state of the economy. Participants of my survey, in addition to collegeage and entry-level Japanese in general, would probably be more willing to fully
reject the tradition of lifelong employment if the economy of Japan were in a
better state.
Increasing Amount of Layoffs
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When considering the state of the economy, lifelong employment, and
individualism, what we see is a paradox. Japanese youth wish to express
themselves freely and choose their own paths with regards to their careers, but at
the same time, some are concerned with security in a weak global environment
and welcome employment for life. However, those that wish to obtain stable jobs
may be out of luck as the lifelong employment system of Japan is sustaining a
significant amount of pressure. Many companies, who have guaranteed their
employees jobs for life, are increasingly letting more and more of their workers
go due to economic hardships. According to Wolff, cited by Jackson, an
international comparative study of listed companies with more than 2000
employees found an increasing proportion of Japanese firms downsizing
their workforce by 10 per cent or more during the recession. In 1991, the
proportion was 2 per cent; in 2001, it had tripled to 6 per cent; and in 2002,
it had peaked at close to 11 per cent (2008, p 67-68).
When companies stated that they would only let their employees go during the
direst of times, this may have been to what they were referring. In order to
survive economically, Japanese organizations are making significant changes to
their management practices.
Only companies that are able to implement a rigorous and impartial
procedure of “selection and concentration” will survive the next couple of
years. Companies are only just beginning to understand the dangers of
maintaining large inventories and are beginning to scale back. In this new
corporate reality, businessmen are increasingly subject to demotion and
firing, making wage labor an unstable source of masculine identity and
human dignity (Robertson, 2004, p. 141).
The one that bears the impact of these managerial changes is the salarymen.
Their perception of loyalty has been shattered with corporations making such
decisions.
The Disintegration of Devotion
As a result of more employees being laid-off by their corporation or
“substitute family”, they have less motivation to be loyal. Companies that had
“aggressively sought experienced workers as well as entry-level college seniors”
during the 1980s had no other choice but to “cast off many employees… through
buyouts and dismissals” when the state of the economy fell during the decade
after (Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11). Feeling betrayed and disillusioned due to
“midcareer hirings and midcareer dismissals”, Japanese thus had “a weakened
national attachment to one job for life” (Tanikawa, 1995, p. 11).
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In addition, difficult economic circumstances were one of the primary
reasons that the aforementioned freeters came about during the late 1990s.
The declining chance of coming across a permanent job to which a young
person can commit themselves undermines their commitment to a job in
which they are currently engaged, and results in a rash of unemployment
and job-switching” (Robertson, 2005, p. 136).
Japanese companies are also turning to a new source of labor: part-time
and temporary employees. Expendable “dispatch workers”, making up nearly a
third of the work force in the 2000s, are hired temporarily while loyal employees
are laid off (Parry, 2009, p. 39). Hamada points out that the “hiring of
temporaries and female workers is considered a desirable cost-saving strategy”
(Robertson, 2004, p. 140). However, since these workers know that they will not
be with a particular company for the long term, let alone the rest of their lives,
there is much less dedication for their impermanent employer.
Due to the economic downturn, forcing many companies to lay off their
dedicated employees and hire new ones that will be around only for so long with
no real stake in their firm, in addition to those independent Japanese youth that
have already shunned the tradition in exchange for expressionism, do lifelong
employment and salarymen stand a chance of surviving?
VII. Gender Issues in Japan
Gender discrimination has always been a prominent issue in Japan with a
society dominated by men. Women are often treated as lesser citizens in regards
to work, pay, and social status.
The conventional male response to the women’s movement and the
demands expressed by women for change up until now has been to
suppress, ignore, and ridicule them and to dismiss them as a troublesome
minority (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 248).
The majority of Japanese women do not enjoy the benefits of lifelong
employment or have the privilege of holding executive positions. According to
Herbig, “few become managers – only 1 per cent of section chiefs are women”
(1995, p. 56). Generally, Japanese women receive less training than their male
colleagues, thus decreasing their chances of advancing within the company.
Japanese women have little opportunity for growth in the corporate realm since
many Japanese firms hire them solely for tedious, administrative purposes
(Hirakawa, 2004, p. 431). Known as office ladies, their male managers refer to
them as “girls”, indicating their superiority and the incompetence they perceive
females to have. Japanese women are greatly hindered from reaching managerial
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positions by the “system of lifetime employment, the seniority system, and the
bureaucratic, tightly knit nature of industrial policy” (Robertson, 2004, p. 132).
Japanese women have become tired of the gender discrimination that has
existed for years. With the turn of the century, the “stagnated, male-centered
economy and society [of Japan] have come under attack” (Robertson, 2005, p.
316). Japanese women, influenced by the West, see how American woman are
treated as equals and wish for the same. The system of lifelong employment,
dominated by males, is fading as women strive for more equality and
independence. With women increasingly making up more and more of the
workforce in Japan, yet not being included in the lifelong employment system,
firms will have to rethink their strategies or be forced to eventually give up the
tradition altogether. More Japanese men are also realizing that they cannot treat
their female counterparts as pests. As a result, a select number of Japanese
husbands are assuming more feminine roles and exerting their own
expressionism.
Breaking Down the Gender Dichotomy
Many proponents of gender equality in Japan have encouraged Japanese
women to consider evaluating Western or American society. Female
critics, in discussing women's ideal lifestyles, often encourage women to
defect to the liberated West, criticizing Japanese society and the Japanese
male as hopelessly mired in tradition” (Hirakawa, 2004, p. 424).
Modernization between world wars facilitated the notion that “the symbol
of all that was appealing… in this new, Westernized world, was the modern
women – an individual who transgressed social boundaries and questioned her
dependence on men” (Adams, 2009, p. 41). Some Japanese women actually
prefer American husbands because they believe that a non-Japanese man will treat
them as an equal and let them have more independence and mobility. Revisiting
the consumer culture that has infiltrated Japanese lifestyles, some Japanese
women believe that “western styles and goods hold the promise of western-style
relationships. Westernization of the home indicates a move from feudal relations,
associated with obligation and hierarchy, to democratic relations, characterized by
choice” (Tobin, 1992, p. 107). Hirakawa asserts that “a considerable number of
middle-class Japanese women do desire to live beyond the prescribed role of
homebound mother/wife” (2004, p. 435). They want to be free from the
obligation of bearing children and taking care of the house. Instead, more
Japanese women want to find self-actualization beyond mere maternal roles.
…the latest research findings also indicate that the image of the selfsacrificing, nurturing mother may no longer fit a majority of young
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mothers now in the middle of their childbearing years… research on
young mothers in their twenties and thirties indicates that this new
generation does not necessarily subscribe to the believe that kodomo ga
ikigai (my child is my raison d’être) (Robertson, 2005, p. 133).
By rejecting traditional feminist roles women are straying from
conventional Japanese ways. They wish for the equality and independence that
the West gives and because “Japanese masculinity has become more and more
directly linked to corporate employment”, the conventional custom of having one
career for the rest of their lives probably would not appeal to them (Robertson,
2005, p. 131).
When I observed Japanese girls during my time abroad, I saw that some
were still financially and socially dependent upon their boyfriends, most likely
stemming from Japan’s consumer culture. However, I did have Japanese friends
that were independent; they were living on their own in Japan or have studied
abroad by themselves in the United States. Perhaps the dependency is beginning
to dwindle with the combination of individualism and a growing need for
equality.
Furthermore, although my surveys indicated that most mothers of the
Japanese youth culture of the 2000s were housewives, it is important to remember
that it is difficult for people to break out of the highly-patterned culture of Japan.
In Japan, society expects people to abide by “the security of group-belonging, and
men and women are relegated to separate spheres – men to the workplace, and
women to the home” (Hirakawa, 2004, p. 428).
A Salaryman’s Version of Expressionism?
As the number of Japanese women wanting to be more independent
increases, Japanese men are beginning to heed to their wishes. In addition to this,
the burdensome life of a salarymen exhausts them. As a result, the traditional
custom of lifelong employment has become weakened.
The growing expression of dissatisfaction on the part of women has
resonated in the hearts of many men precisely because so many issues that
need to be dealt with have been building up among men themselves. One
such issue is that of karoshi, or ‘death resulting from overwork’
(Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 249).
Japanese husbands were beginning to reevaluate their lives during the
1990s. A number of salarymen, civil workers, and teachers who wanted to
redirect their lives while breaking down gender stereotypes founded an
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organization called Men Concerned about Child Care (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995,
p. 250). Instead of allowing their wives to assume the traditional feminine role in
the house, these men took on household responsibilities such as raising the
children or doing chores. Similar to the Japanese youth culture and their need for
freedom and individuality, for these Japanese working men, “spending time with
family and friends and doing what they personally enjoy is more important to
them than work-related activities. Thus, they rarely put in overtime at work and
do not hesitate to take vacations” (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 251).
These salarymen seem to be exerting their own type of expressionism. By
making choices based upon their own wants, the company has come second.
With a gradually-growing loyalty for one’s family, and the rejection “of a genderbased division of labor”, the male-dominated system of lifelong employment will
fall by the wayside (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 251).
Although the men that share these views are still a “small minority within
Japanese society… they are beginning to have some impact on [others]”
(Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995, p. 253). As time progresses with more women’s
movements and more Japanese men becoming aware of human rights and equality,
perhaps the society of Japan will give women more sovereignty in the home as
well as the workplace.
VII. Conclusion
Is the tradition of lifelong employment on the road to extinction? Will the
once-venerated Japanese salarymen die out along with it? With all of these
factors going against them – consumerism, individualism, expressionism, new
values and attitudes among the Japanese youth culture, a poor economy, and
gender issues – it seems very possible. Through various literature and my
surveys, it is evident that there are attitudes among some young Japanese that
conflict with the Confucian values that perpetuate the tradition of lifelong
employment. Furthermore, the global economic crisis has forced many Japanese
companies to rethink their hiring strategies, thus contributing to the change.
Some scholars such as Wolff believe that the system of lifelong
employment will soon be wiped out altogether. He cites Moriguchi and Ono, who
concluded with a survey in 2002 that more than half of eight hundred Japanese
companies could no longer guarantee lifelong employment for their workers
(Wolff, 2008, p. 67). From the 1960s to the year 2000, Japanese corporations
were able to sustain the system of lifelong employment via deployments to other
office branches (Wolff, 2008, p. 68). However, it was around the 1990s that
Japanese firms became more reluctant to offer their workers employment for life,
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thus marking the “‘death’ or deinstitutionalization of lifelong employment”
(Wolff, 2008, p. 54).
Although some may say that the tradition of lifelong employment and the
salarymen of Japan will stay alive with a few conservative firms, this is debatable;
if those companies want to stay alive and grow, they will probably have to make a
few changes along with many other Japanese corporations that downsized their
labor force. With a depressed economy, employees with dwindling dedication, an
individualistic youth culture lacking Confucian values, and Japanese women
rejecting traditional gender roles, the gradual extinction of the lifelong
employment and the age of the Japanese salarymen are imminent.
VIII. Epilogue
The decline of the traditional employment system, despite its gradual
occurrence, represents a significant shift in Japanese culture and society.
Essentially, this shift illustrates a change in the Japanese population; an increasing
amount of Japanese are leaning toward values pertaining to global citizenship.
The younger generations of Japan, who are interested in pursuing career paths that
are meaningful to them, have the opportunity to exercise more freedom compared
to the restriction of one company. With this, they have more flexibility, creativity,
and consequently, a greater proclivity to diversity. This mindset allows Japanese
youth to find motivation to explore other cultures or languages. One of the
students I surveyed in 2009 had a great interest in the German language. It was
not for the purpose of Japanese nationalism or for her company, but for her own
pursuit. By delving into the German language and culture, she was being a global
citizen. Increased intra-cultural communication among the Japanese youth overall
compared to older generations illustrates an increased inclination towards global
citizenship.
Haffner, Klett, and Lehmann capture Japan’s post-modern situation
regarding global citizenship perfectly by saying, “The Japanese people - in the
sense of 127 million individual Japanese, as opposed to the “one nation” Japan would be on the whole much happier, more self-fulfilled... They would also be
far better globally integrated” (2009, p. 14). With the Japanese youth considering
more career options and individualism, the result is more global Japanese citizens
to foster better connections with other nations in the international community.
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